We propose a formal treatment of scenarios in the context of a dialectical argumentation for malism for qualitative reasoning about uncertain propositions. Our fo rmalism extends prior work in which arguments for and against uncertain propositions were presented and compared in in teraction spaces called Agoras. We now define the notion of a scenario in this fr amework and use it to define a set of qualitative uncertainty labels for propositions across a collection of scenarios. This work is intended to lead to a formal theory of scenarios and scenario analysis.
Introduction
In many domains, the absence of hard data or the presence of conflicting perceived interests makes reaching agree ment on the quantification of uncertainty difficult. Argu mentation formalisms have been proposed for the quali tative representation of uncertainty in these circumstances (Krause et al. 1995) and have found application in intel ligent systems, for example in medical and safety analysis domains (Carbogim, Robertson, & Lee 2000) . In (McBur ney & Parsons 2000), we proposed a formalism using di alectical argumentation for representing and resolving the arguments for and against uncertain propositions. This rep resentation was grounded in specific theories of rational human discourse and was centered on an electronic space for presentation of arguments, which we termed an Agora. In subsequent work (McBurney & Parsons 2001b) , we ex tended this formalism and demonstrated that it had several desirable properties when used for inference and decision making. In this paper, we further extend this fr amework to enable dialectical argumentation under and between multi ple circumstances, or scenarios.
The notion of scenario (Schwartz 1991) has found widespread application in business forecasting, in public Simon Parsons
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Cambridge MA USA sparsons®mit.edu policy determination, and in scientific domains. An early use of the methods of scenario analysis may be seen in nineteenth-century statistical mechanics, where research sought to determine if the properties of a physical system, such as its entropy at a given time, depended on the sys tem's initial state. Ludwig Boltzmann (Boltzmann 1872) tackled this problem by comparing the given system to a collection of alternative, imaginary systems, each having different initial conditions -i.e., what we would now call scenarios. By doing so, he could potentially assess the ex tent to which the system property of interest was indepen dent of the initial system state. Josiah W. Gibbs (Gibbs 1902) fo rmalized the concept of a collection of alternative systems with his notion of ensemble, a term we also use.
Perhaps the most important and complex recent application of scenario analysis has been in the work of the Intergov ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (McCarthy et at. 2001 ) , the UN agency tasked with assessing the current and possible future states of the world's ecosystem, and with considering and recommending appropriate environ mental regulatory policies. In this domain, scenario analy sis has been used for scientific modeling and prediction, for the modeling of socio-economic variables and conditions, and for the assessment of proposed regulatory policies and targets (Carter & others 2001) .
Despite their widespread use, however, there appears to be no fo rmal theory of scenarios or scenario analysis. With out a formal theory, many questions remain without rig orous answers, e.g., How should scenarios be constituted? How many scenarios should be considered? How should individual scenarios be analysed? How should any differ ences in the likelihood of occurrence of different scenarios be represented? How should their relative importance be represented? How should reasoning be undertaken across a collection of scenarios, or multiple collections of scenar ios? In the absence of a formal theory of scenarios it is difficult to assess the validity or reliability of any particu lar application of scenario analysis, for example, the many analyses generated by the work ofthe IPCC (Carter & oth ers 2001 ) . Moreover, because no computational theory of scenarios yet exists, application of scenario analysis in in telligent systems is limited.
The long-term aim of the research reported here is a rig orous, formal, computational theory of scenarios. In this paper, we take an initial step towards this aim, by consid ering one type of scenario, those based on dialectical ar gumentation systems. In Section 2, we review our model for qualitative inference in uncertain domains, which uses dialectical argumentation to represent conflicting, ambigu ous or contested information. Section 3 defines our no tions of scenario and ensemble, while Section 4 considers the question of when two scenarios may be considered dis tinct. Section 5 then considers how many observations we need to take for any debate in order to estimate its long term position; here we prove what we believe to be an im portant theorem, Proposition 4, which says that the most recent snapshot of a debate is at least as good, in a precise sense, as any combination of earlier snapshots. In Section 6, we consider the the assignment of uncertainty labels to uncertain propositions on the basis of their argumentation status in a collection of scenarios. This is illustrated with an example in Section 7 and the paper concludes with a discussion of related work in Section 8.
One possible response to these proposals is that scenario analysis is unnecessary in an argumentation context, be cause these frameworks have been developed precisely to represent conflicting or uncertain information, and to re solve any inconsistency in the resulting conclusions. Such a view is mistaken. In a typical application, we are not merely trying to decide whether the possible arguments for some given claim are, on balance, stronger or weaker than the arguments against it; we are also trying to identify the circumstances (the assumptions and allowed rules of infer ence) under which arguments exist for or against the claim, and the circumstances under which those arguments for it are stronger than those against it. To do this rigorously, we need to clearly demarcate the sets of possible circum stances -i.e., the scenarios -from one another and to compare them.
Dialectical Argumentation
In this section we briefly summarize the Agora framework for the qualitative representation of uncertainty presented in (McBurney & Parsons 2000; 2001b) . In this frame work, arguments for and against claims are articulated by participants in an electronic space, called an Agora, with claims expressed as formulae in a propositional language. By means of defined locutions, participants in the Agora can variously posit, assert, contest, justify, rebut, undercut, qualify and retract claims, just as happens in real discourse. For example, a debate participant P i could demonstrate her argument A(-+ 11) supporting a claim 11, an argument to which she was committed with strength D, by means of the locution:
show_arg(P; :A(-+ 11 , D)).
The rules governing the use of each permitted locution are expressed in terms of a formal dialogue-game between the participants (Hamblin 1970) . We assume that the Agora participants begin a debate with a set of agreed facts, or as sumptions, and an agreed set of inference rules. Because we want to model many forms of reasoning, these rules need not be deductive and may themselves, in our Agora formulation, be the subject of argument.
We demonstrated the use of this framework for the rep resentation of uncertainty by defining a set of uncertainty labels assigned to claims on the basis of the arguments pre sented for and against them in the Agora. Essentially, one could say that claims have more credibility (and hence less uncertainty) the fewer and the weaker are the arguments against them. While any set of labels could be so defined,
we drew on earlier work in argumentation (Krause et a/. 1995) and defined the set: {Accepted, Probable, Plausi ble, Supported, Open}, with the elements listed in decreas ing order of certainty. For example, a claim was regarded as Probable at a particular time if at least one consistent argument had been presented for it in the Agora by that time, but no arguments for its negation (rebuttals) nor for the negation of any of its assumptions (undercuts) had been presented by then. We defined a claim as well-defended at a given time if there was an argument for it at that time and any rebuttals or undercuts had themselves been subject to counter-rebuttals or to undercuts. Accepted claims at any time were defined as those which are well-defended at that time. 1
As arguments for and against a proposition are presented to the Agora, the status of a proposition may rise and fall: a claim considered Probable at one time may be only Plau sible later, and then be Accepted later again. We therefore defined the truth-valuation of a claim e at time t, denoted Vt(B), to be 1 if e had the label Accepted at this time, oth erwise it was 0. Such a valuation summarizes the knowl edge of the community of debate participants at the partic ular time, since it incorporates, via the definitions of the la bels, all the arguments for and against e articulated to that time. Consequently, assessing the truth-status of a claim at a particular time can be viewed as taking a snapshot of an Agora debate. Of course, because these definitions are time-dependent, and arguments may be articulated in the Agora at any time, such an assignment of uncertainty labels and truth valuation must be defeasible. Claims accepted at one time may be overturned at another, in the light of new information learnt or arguments presented subsequently.
In using the Agora framework to represent uncertainty, at-1 These labels are assigned on the basis of the arguments pre sented by all participants in the Agora; thus, individual partici pants may not agree with any label assignment, since their own arguments will typically only be a subset of those presented.
tention will focus on the truth valuation function over the long-run 2 The sequence (v1(B) It= 1, 2, ... ) may or may not converge as t --* oo. Suppose that it does converge, and denote its limit value by v00(B). What will the value of a snapshot taken at timet, namely Vt (B), tell us about v00 (B) ?
Of course, since any finite snapshot risks being overtaken by subsequent information or arguments, we cannot infer with complete accuracy from the finite snapshot to the infi nite value. However, we have shown (McBurney & Parsons 200lb) that, under certain conditions, we can place a bound on the likelihood that such an inference is in error. The con ditions essentially require that: (a) the snapshot is taken at a time after commencement sufficient for all the arguments using the initial information to have been presented, and (b) there is a bound on the probability that new informa tion arises following the snapshot. This result is proved as Proposition 7 of (McBurney & Parsons 200lb), which we reproduce here. For this, we first need some definitions.
Definition 1: We write LEe for the statement: "The func tion v1(B) converges to a finite limit as t --* oo." We also write X1,e for the statement: "New information relevant to B becomes known to an Agora participant after time t."
In general, at any time s, we do not know whether new evi dence will become available to Agora participants at a later timet or not. Consequently, the variables X1,e, fort not in the past, represent uncertain events. Also uncertain for the same reason are statements concerning the future values of Vt (B) for any B. Because these events are uncertain, we as sume the existence of a probability function over them, i.e., a real-valued measure function mapping such statements to [0 , 1] which satisfies the axioms of probability.
Definition 2: Pr(.) is a probability function defined over statements of the form Xt,e and statements concerning the values of Vt (B), for any formula B. 
Then the following inequalities hold:
Pr(LEe and v00(B) = 11 Vt�(B) = 1) � 1-E.
Pr(LEe and V00(B) = 0 I v1� (B) = 1) ::; c.
D
Like the standard (Neyman-Pearson) procedures for statis tical hypothesis testing, this proposition provides us with some confidence in our use of finite snapshots to make in ferences about the long-run truth-valuation function for a debate. While such inference is not deductively valid, at 2 Strictly, we are assuming throughout that time in the Agora is discrete, and can be represented by a countably-infinite set.
least its likelihood of error may be bounded. 3 In the sec tions below, we will be comparing the results of debates in more than one Agora. We therefore assume that we have a single probability function Pr defined across all the rel evant statements. We will also index symbols with super scripts e, 2 , etc) to denote the Agora to which they refer.
We next define the concept of Scenario.
Scenarios and Ensembles
The framework we have just outlined provides a means to represent the diverse arguments that may be derived from a given set of assumptions, by means of a given set of in ference rules (deductive or otherwise). If we were to start with a different set of assumptions, and/or permit the use of different inference rules, the arguments presented in the Agora could well be different. As a result, the uncertainty labels and truth values assigned to formulae could also be different, both when taken at finite snapshots and in the limit. Each collection of alternative sets of assumptions and inference rules we call a scenario, which we define as follows:
Definition 3: A Scenario for a given domain consists of a set of assumptions and a set of inference rules, with which participants are equipped at the commencement of an Agora debate over propositions in that domain. We de note scenarios for a given domain by S1, S 2 , ••• , etc. For each scenario, S i , an Agora debate undertaken with the assumptions and inference rules of that scenario, is said to be the associated Agora, denoted A i . We assume only one debate is conducted in association with any scenario.
Because we wish to reason across multiple scenarios, we also define:
Definition 4: An Ensemble S is a finite collection of dis tinct Scenarios { S1, ... , s m } relating to a common do main. We assume that, associated with each scenario
We call a = (a 1 , a 2 , ... , a m ) the ensemble weights vector of S.
We do not assume the weights sum to unity across the m scenarios, although they may do so. The weights may vary with time, but, if so, we assume that their assignment to scenarios is independent of the dialectical status of claims in the corresponding debates. This assumption is made be cause the assignment of weights to scenarios should be on the basis of characteristics of the scenarios themselves, not on the basis of arguments which ensue or don't ensue in the associated Agora debates.
What interpretation we give to the weights depends upon the meanings we give to the logical language, to the sce narios and to arguments for claims in the corresponding Agora debates. For example, the assumptions and claims may represent objects in the physical world, and the in ference rules physical manipulations of these objects, such as actual construction of new objects from existing ones. Scenarios can thus be interpreted as different sets of re sourcing assumptions, with claims being well-defended in an Agora debate when the objects they represent are able to be constructed with the assumed resources. In this in terpretation, the weights attached to scenarios may be the relative costs or benefits of different resources, or their like lihoods of occurrence. A second interpretation could arise where the scenarios represent alternative sets of rules of procedure for interaction between a group of participants, for example, in a legal domain or in automated negotiation.
Here the rules of inference may represent different allow able modes of reasoning, such as reasoning by analogy or from authority. The weights may represent the extent of compliance of each scenario with some set of principles of rational discourse, such as those of (Hitchcock 1991) , or with some normative economic or political theory. Finally, a third interpretation would have the scenarios as different descriptions of some uncertain domain, for example differ ent scientific theories, with propositions being statements about the domain, and the inference rules representing dif ferent causal mechanisms. The scenario weights could be relative likelihoods of occurrence, or valuations of relative importance or utility. This third interpretation is the one we will consider in this paper.
Comparing Scenarios

Comparing two long-run debates
Our definition of an Ensemble says that the scenarios in cluded must be distinct. We require this so that when ag gregating across scenarios we do not engage in "double counting" of separate scenarios which are really the same. When are two scenarios the same? Obviously, we may con sider them to be the same when they have identical sets of assumptions and inference rules. But two scenarios iden tical in this fashion may result in very different Agora de bates, as different arguments may be presented in each, or the same arguments may be presented at different times. It is not clear, therefore, that identical scenarios will lead to identical assignments of truth-labels, even over the long run; we show that, under certain conditions, they will do so. Throughout this section S 1 and S 2 will be two scenarios of interest, and A 1 and A 2 their associated Agora debates.
Proposition 2: Let () be a claim. Suppose that S 1 and S 2 are identical scenarios, i.e., they have identical sets of as sumptions and identical sets of inference rules. Suppose that in the corresponding Agora debates, A 1 and A 2 , all possible arguments based on the initial assumptions and using the inference rules are eventually articulated. Sup pose further that no new information is presented to either debate following commencement. Then, the long-run truth status of() in each debate is the same.
Outline of Proof: Given the premises, the only way the two debates will potentially differ will be in the order that arguments are articulated. But if all arguments are even tually articulated, then after some finite time no further ar guments will be presented in either debate. Outline of Proof: By the previous result, the two long-run assignments of truth to () are only different if one or other debate receives new information. The probability that this occurs is less than or equal to the sum of the probabilities that either debate receives new information less the prob ability that they both do. This latter event has probability greater than or equal to zero, and the inequality follows by algebraic manipulation. 
A decision rule for scenario comparison
We now provide a decision rule for determining if two sce narios S1 and S 2 are the same. This decision rule clas sifies scenarios into two classes, labeled distinct and non distinct. The rule proposed for determination of distinct ness of scenarios uses two criteria (in order of application): (a) whether or not the two scenarios have identical assump tions and inference rules; (b) in the case where they do, whether or not either scenario is judged to have a high prob ability of receiving new information.
Case 1: S1 f. S 2 • Conclude that the two scenarios are distinct.
Case 2A: S1 = S 2 and Pr(XJ e ), Pr(XJ e) both small.
In this case, the likelihood � f new info � ation arising in either scenario is small and Proposition 3 allows us to infer that v�(B) = v�(B) with high probability.
Conclude that the two scenarios are non-distinct.
Case 2B: S1 = S 2 and one or both of Pr(XJ , 0), Pr(XJ , e) large. In this case, the likelihood of new information arising in at least one scenario is large, and thus, Proposition 3, it is unlikely that v�(B) = v�(B). Conclude that the two scenarios are distinct. 4
In the first case, where the two scenarios have different premises and/or inference rules, we classify them as dis tinct. Two such distinct scenarios, of course, may result in the same arguments being presented in both scenarios af ter some finite time. In the other two cases (Cases 2A and 2B), where the underlying assumptions and inference rules are the same in the two scenarios, Proposition 2 says that the long run truth assignments for {I in the corresponding Agora debates, if they exist, will be identical, provided no new information is presented in either Agora debate fol lowing commencement. If new information is presented, then Proposition 3 provides a bound for the probability that the long-run truth assignments are the same, in terms of the probabilities of new information being received. In the case (Case 2A) when these probabilities are believed to be small, the two long-run truth assignments are most likely identical, and we can classify the two scenarios as being the same. In the other case (Case 2B), where one or both probabilities are large, we classify the two scenarios as not the same.
Note that, although under Cases 2A and 2B we are mak ing inferences about the long run truth assignments, v � (B) and v� (B), these inferences are based only on the premises and inference rules used and assessments of the probability of new information being received after commencement of the associated Agora debates. These inferences, and hence this classification, do not depend on the progress or status of the debates themselves. In other words, our classifica tion of scenarios is not based on the output of the debates conducted under the scenarios.
Observing Agora debates
What may we feasibly observe about an Agora debate? Firstly, we could take a snapshot at a particular finite time after commencement. Or, secondly, we could take a num ber of such snapshots. Or, thirdly, we could examine the actual arguments used in a debate from commencement up to a particular time. In the first subsection below, we show that taking the most recent snapshot is at least as good an indicator of the long run status of a debate as any other combination of earlier snapshots. In other words, we need only take one snapshot to capture all the information avail able in a debate. In the second subsection we consider how we may compare a snapshot from one debate with that from another. The third approach -considering the arguments themselves -we leave for another occasion. As before, we denote the long-run truth status of a formula {I in debate i, if this limit exists, by vt,(B) = limt-+oo vf(B). The sub sections which follow will discuss finite estimators of this long-run value, estimators we denote by iJ t, (B). (Huber 1981) . For instance, we may delete those at the begin ning of the sequence, on an assumption that early values of Vt (B) will oscillate as all the relevant arguments are pre sented to the Agora; (c) the mode, the most common value, i.e., whichever of 0 or 1 appears most frequently in the n observations; etc.
However, each truth-valuation v k is defined in terms of the arguments presented to the Agora up to time k, so, in some sense, each observation summarizes all the information rel evant to B up to and including the time the observation was made. We should therefore expect the final observation, v n to contain the most information, and so to be the best es timator (in some sense) of the long-run value, v00•5 This is indeed the case, as the following theorem shows. For simplicity, we omit {I from the notation.
Proposition 4: Let VI, vz, ... , Vn be a sequence of n snap shot values concerning B taken from a debate A. Suppose the limit V00 = limn->oo Vn exists. Let Vn be the estimator of V00 using only the final observation in such a sequence. Further, let iJ� be any estimator of v00 based on these n observations which converges to a finite limit as n -+ oo. Then:
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. If the result does not hold, then there must exist £ > 0 such that:
--,---.:! n =->::.: oo ::::
Then, there must be infinitely many m such that lvmv00 I > lv;;, -V00 I· Since the sequence of final values Vn is a sequence of zeros or ones, and it converges to v 00, then for each of these m, we have one of two cases:
[v00 = 1:] By the strict inequality, we must have V m = 0.
[v00 = 0:] Likewise, we must have Vm = 1
But this happens for infinitely many values m, which con tradicts the assumption that Vn converges to v00• 0 This result shows that the final observation of a sequence of snapshots is at least as good, in the long run, as any other convergent estimator of v 00 based on this sequence. We therefore need only consider the most recent snapshot in any assessment of the truth status of a claim in a debate.
Comparing two debates
We now consider the comparison of two Agora debates, undertaken under different scenarios, by means of finite snapshots of each at a particular time t after commence ment. Each snapshot, vj(8), will give us an assessment of the long-term truth-status of a claim 8 in each debate A i, fori= 1, 2. That is, we set v�(8) = vi(8). Proposition I tells us that we can bound the probability of error in infer ring from the finite estimate v � ( 8) to the true infinite limit value v � ( 8) . Can we also bound the probability of error when inferring from a comparison of the finite values? The next proposition provides such bounds.
Proposition 5: Let e be a formula, and let A I, A 2 be two Agora debates associated with scenarios S 1 , S2 re spectively. Suppose that, in debate A i ( i = 1, 2 J, all ar guments pertaining to e and using the information avail able at commencement are articulated by participants by some time s; > 0. Suppose further that there is a time Proof. Arguments similar to Proposition 3.
0
Using simultaneous finite snapshots of two debates to make an inference about the long-run truth-status of a formula is a process prone to error. This result says that, under certain circumstances, we can bound the probability of such er rors. The "certain circumstances" relate to the timing of the snapshots -which must be long enough into the two de bates for all the arguments based on the initial information to have been presented -and to the probabilities of new information being presented to each debate subsequent to the snapshots being taken. As one would expect, the error bounds are functions of these probabilities. 6
In proving this result, we have not assumed that the event of new information being presented to one Agora debate is independent of new information being presented to the other. If we were able to make such an assumption, our er ror bounds would be tighter, with the product € 1 € 2 added to the right-hand side of the first and fourth inequalities and subtracted from the second and third. Independence of these two events is a function of how "distinct" are the two scenarios. Scenarios in the same domain which are very similar are likely to experience new information con currently; participants in the corresponding debates are also likely to make similar assessments of the relevance of such new information. Definition 5: Given an ensembleS and a proposition 8, we define the Ensemble support for 8 at time t by s (e) = I:;':.I aiv t (B) m t ""' m i W i =l a 6 Qne could also view each sequence as arising from a ran dom process, and so view the comparison problem as a test of an hypothesis that the two sequences are governed by the same probability distribution. Because the form of the distributions is not specified, the appropriate test would be nonparametric, e.g., the Kolmogorov-Smimov two-sample test (Gibbons 1985) . How ever, the asymptotic theory for even these tests requires that the underlying distributions be continuous and that the two samples be drawn independently. Neither assumption is appropriate here.
Reasoning across Scenarios
Given a fixed real number c E (0, 0.5), we now define var ious classes of support, as follows:
8 is said to be Inevitable at time t precisely when mf ( 8) = 1. This class of propositions is denoted AI,t· 8 is said to be 100(1 -c) %-Certain at timet precisely when mf (8) 
Discussion
Despite their widespread use, there is as yet no formal, computational theory of scenarios and scenario analysis.
In this paper, we have commenced work on such a theory for scenarios which describe debates over uncertain propo sitions. In our formalism a scenario is a set of specified premises and inference rules, which participants to a de bate use to engage in argument. We have presented a rule for determining whether two such scenarios are distinct or not, based only on their respective premises and inference rules, and on estimates of the probability that each debate will receive new information in the future. We have also shown that, when using finite snapshots of a debate to es timate the long-run truth status of a proposition, it is suf-ficient to use the most recent snapshot; this is at least as good (in a precise sense) as using earlier snapshots. We then defined a set of qualitative uncertainty labels for the truth status of claims when debates have been conducted under multiple, distinct scenarios. These labels provide a means to aggregate across the scenarios in a formal man ner. Assigning weights to the scenarios -for example, to represent their relative probabilities of occurrence -en ables the aggregate-level labels to be used to predict the truth-status of claims in the world beyond the debates.
The work presented here is novel. The closest work we have found used cellular automata to define a mathematical theory of computer simulations (Barrett & Reidys 1999) , but this work has not yet considered inference from a col lection of simulations. Our use of multiple simultaneous debates (scenarios) is conceptually similar to other work in AI using multiple possible worlds. For example, in the Ents model of belief of (Paris & Vencovska 1993) , an agent's be lief in a claim is determined by imagining possible worlds in which the claim is decided, either true or false, and then belief in the claim is set equal to the proportion of possi ble worlds in which it is true. In this model, the possible worlds are assumed equi-probable. This is also a feature of the model of (Bacchus et a/. 1996), which assigns de grees of belief to propositions on the basis of the proportion of possible worlds in which there is evidence for them. In contrast, our approach allows scenarios (possible worlds) to be weighted differentially. Moreover, our approach pro vides a mechanism for deciding the truth-status of proposi tions within in each scenario, that of (McBurney & Parsons 2001b) . Within AI, scenarios have also been used, e.g., as alternative possible explanations in probabilistic causal in fluence models (Henrion & Druzdzel 1991) .
One criticism of the framework above is the possible sen sitivity of conclusions to the particular weights assigned to scenarios. In future work we will seek to formalize the process of assigning ensemble weights, and to extend this overall approach beyond argumentation contexts. Poten tial applications will then include intelligent systems to aid decision-making in environmental domains (McBurney & Parsons 2001 a) , and assessment of scenario analysis in the climate change arena.
